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Radicalisation, community and the politics of protest in the Spanish Second Republic, 
Asturias 1931-1934* 
 
In the early hours of 5 October 1934, the sound of dynamite exploding signalled the 
beginning of a revolutionary insurrection in the coal valleys of the northern Spanish region of 
Asturias. For two weeks revolutionary militias fought government forces while committees 
formed by local leftist politicians and union leaders reorganised life behind the lines, 
requisitioning and distributing food, restructuring medical services, banning money and 
producing self-consciously revolutionary propaganda. The movement, planned by the 
socialist leadership in Madrid, was intended to be national, but only in Asturias did it lead to 
a large-scale revolutionary insurrection during which approximately 2,000 died. 1  The 
insurrection was a crucial event in the evolution of the Second Republic (1931-1936) and a 
milestone in the polarisation of Spanish society prior to the Civil War (1936-1939). The 
insurrection elicited international outcry, investigative trips and solidarity campaigns in 
response to the repressive measures undertaken by the government to suppress the 
insurrection. The most important revolution in Western Europe since the Paris Commune, the 
Asturian insurrection was also the most violent and sustained outburst of protest in the 
specific juncture of 1934—including the February crisis which threatened the French Third 
Republic, and a short-lived insurrection by the Austrian socialists in a dark decade for the 
European left. 
                                                
* I am grateful to Mary Vincent for her guidance and to Adrian Shubert, Martin Conway and the anonymous 
reviewers for their insightful comments. This research is based on a PhD project which was funded by a 
University of Sheffield scholarship.  
1 The main accounts of the insurrection date from the 1970s and 1980s. See A. Shubert, The Road to Revolution 
in Spain. The Coal Miners of Asturias 1860-1934 (Urbana/Chicago, 1987); D. Ruiz, Insurrección defensiva y 
revolución obrera: el octubre español de 1934 (Barcelona, 1988) and P.I. Taibo II’s reedited 1978 account 
Asturias, octubre 1934 (Barcelona, 2013). 
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 This article analyses political practice and the lived experience of the Asturian 
coalfields prior to October 1934 in order to provide a new explanation as to why the Asturian 
insurrection exploded with such force, rethink the process of leftist radicalisation which is 
central to understandings of the Second Republic and provide a more nuanced approach to 
the study of democracy and political practice in the Second Republic.2 In doing so, the article 
sheds new light on processes of polarisation in interwar Europe more widely. Nevertheless, 
recent approaches to the interwar period have added valuable insight into political culture and 
experiences of modernity, interrelated dynamic of left-right mobilisation, and of re-evaluating 
patterns of violence and its relationship to policing the space of the metropolis.3 This article 
emphasises the need to re-evaluate and refocus attention on the industrial working class—
particularly beyond capital cities—due to the centrality of the working class to the struggles 
of the interwar period and socio-political conflicts more broadly.4  
While the emphasis is on working class politics, this article avoids conceptualising 
local society in Asturias through the prism of the trade unions. Trade union policy and 
practices fail to provide an adequate overall explanation of the process of radicalisation; in 
fact a significant breach opened between the socialist mining trade union and the rank-and-
file, and it is more important to understand the trade union as dynamically interacting with 
                                                
2 Recent studies of the Republic, often identified with a ‘revisionist’ turn, have shifted towards being more 
critical of the socialists’ democratic credentials and emphasising ‘intransigence’, though often from a relatively 
narrow and traditional political focus. E.g. F. del Rey, ed., Palabras como puños. La intransigencia política en 
la Segunda República española (Madrid, 2011); S. Payne, The Collapse of the Spanish Republic, 1933-1936. 
The origins of the Civil War (New Haven, CT/London, 2006). A more nuanced approach to democracy in T. 
Buchanan, ‘Anti-fascism and Democracy in the 1930s’, European History Quarterly, Vol. 32 No. 1 (2002), pp. 
39-57. 
3 On interrelated dynamics, discursive strategies and overlap between right and left, e.g. J. Wardhaugh, In 
pursuit of the people. Political Culture in France, 1934-1939 (Basingstoke, 2009); T. Brown, Weimar Radicals. 
Nazis and Communists between Authenticity and Performance (Oxford/New York 2009). There has been a 
renewed interest in political violence recently e.g. C. Millington and K. Passmore, eds, Political Violence and 
Democracy in Western Europe (Basingstoke, 2015); D. Schumann, Political Violence in the Weimar Republic, 
1918-1933. Battle for the Streets and Fears of Civil War (Oxford/New York, 2009) and also in conflict, the rise 
of paramilitarism and ‘brutalisation’ after the First World War. R. Gerwarth and J. Horne, eds, War in Peace. 
Paramilitary Violence in Europe after the Great War (Oxford, 2012). 
4 A recent call for a new history of the working class in the Weimar Republic with an emphasis on political 
practice and how historical actors understood and acted in accordance with their understanding of their context 
in J. Häberlen, ‘Scope for Agency and Political Options. The German Working-Class Movement and the Rise of 
Nazism’, Politics, Religion and Ideology, Vol. 4 No. 3 (2013), pp. 377-94.  
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the grassroots.5 It is through analysis of the coal valleys using the concept of community that 
radicalism can be understood, both in terms of intra-communal, locally-rooted struggles and 
conflicts over the claim to represent and embody the local community.  
Scholars have long noted the geographically rootedness of radical politics, from 
‘Little Moscows’ to ‘Red Cities’.6 In Spain, localities have been used as case studies for 
processes of mobilisation and socio-political conflict.7 Some have conceptualised community 
as a significant factor. Ealham attributes the success of the anarchist CNT (Confederación 
General del Trabajo: National Confederation of Labour) success in Barcelona to its close 
association with neighbourhood struggles, needs and interests, while Radcliffe examined the 
Asturian port city of Gijón in order to understand the process of polarisation which 
culminated in the Civil War, which she conceptualised in terms of a hegemonic struggle. The 
struggle for political power expressed through collective action was thus rooted in 
communities articulated around particular neighbourhoods—but also axes such as gender.8 
Taking a similar approach, this article develops the mobilising power of community identity 
in terms of conflict emerging over defining the local community and how internal dynamics 
and external developments shaped this. Rather than reifying community or considering it to 
                                                
5 As richly undertaken recently by James in his comparative analysis of the discursive projects of trade unions to 
build collective identities in the Ruhr and south Wales. L. James, The politics of identity and civil society in 
Britain and Germany. Miners in the Ruhr and south Wales, 1890-1926 (Manchester/New York, 2008).  
6 S. Macintyre, Little Moscows: Communism and Working Class Militancy in Interwar Britain (London, 1980). 
There is a large literature on ‘red cities’—the intersection of neighbourhood, place and left-wing politics, 
including municipal socialism, e.g. J. Merriman, The Red City: Limoges and the French Nineteenth Century 
(New York/Oxford, 1985); A. Smith, ed., Red Barcelona. Social Protest and Labour Mobilization in the 
Twentieth Century (London/New York, 2002); T. Kaplan, Red City, Blue Period. Social Movements in Picasso’s 
Barcelona (Berkeley/Los Angeles, 1992); H. Gruber, Red Vienna. Experiment in Working Class Culture, 1919-
1934 (New York, 1991). In terms of neighbourhoods e.g. T. Stovall, The Rise of the Parisian Red Belt (Berkeley, 
1990); P. Swett, Neighbors and Enemies. The Culture of Radicalism in Berlin, 1929-1933 (Cambridge, 2004).  
7 E.g. S. Juliá, Madrid, 1931-1934. De la fiesta popular a la lucha de clases (Madrid, 1984); F. del Rey, 
Paisanos en lucha. Exclusión política y violencia en la Segunda República española (Madrid, 2008); C. Gil 
Andrés, Echarse a la calle. Amotinados, huelguistas y revolucionario (La Rioja, 1890-1936) (Zaragoza, 2000). 
The fruits of these studies have been consolidated into two recent historical overviews of protest in Spain: R. 
Cruz, Protestar en España, 1900-2013 (Madrid, 2015) and J.S. Pérez Garzón, Contra el poder. Conflictos y 
movimientos sociales en la historia de España. De la prehistoria al tiempo presente (Granada, 2015).  
8 C. Ealham, Class, Culture and Conflict in Barcelona 1898–1937 (London/New York, 2005); P. Radcliff, From 
Mobilization to Civil War. The Politics of Polarization in the Spanish city of Gijón, 1900-1937 (Cambridge/New 
York/Melbourne, 1996). 
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emanate from a particular social structure, the approach takes community as a double-edged 
sword, inherently inclusive and exclusive. Barron’s recent study of the Durham coalfields 
during the 1926 general strike examines how different factors that formed the basis of 
collective identities overlapped and intersected to construct a more nuanced and complex 
picture of the relationship between class and community.9 The emphasis is thus on the 
practice and meaning of politics at local level in the Asturian coalfields, rather than on 
longer-term explanations that emphasise social structures. Even as concerns were local, these 
struggles and worries were informed by an understanding of the national and wider 
international context.  
Radicalisation is a concept central to understanding the evolution of the Republic. 
This has most commonly been depicted in terms of a chain reaction in which grassroots 
frustration at the unfulfilled promises of the Second Republic funnelled up through the 
socialist movement and steered the thinking and actions of the veteran socialist leader Largo 
Caballero, whose increasingly revolutionary rhetoric led him to gain control of the UGT 
(Unión General de Trabajadores: General Union of Workers) in early 1934.10 The idea of 
radicalisation, without which no history of the Second Republic would be complete, has 
become more of a descriptive label and less of an analytical tool.11 Despite appeals since the 
1970s for the process to be analysed in more depth, little has been done to engage with the 
concept or the process in a rigorous manner, while diverging interpretations of 
                                                
9 H. Barron, The 1926 Miners’ Lockout. Meanings of Community in the Durham Coalfield (Oxford, 2009). 
10 See J. Aróstegui, Largo Caballero. El tesón y la quimera (Barcelona, 2013), p. 297; A. de Blas Guerrero, El 
socialismo radical en la II República (Madrid, 1978), 20. See also Payne, Collapse, pp. 53-4. For Largo 
Caballero responding to the grassroots see, for example, P. Preston, The Coming of the Spanish Civil War. 
Reform, Reaction and Revolution in the Second Republic (London/New York, 1978), pp. 17, 21; N. Townson, 
The Crisis of Democracy in Spain. Centrist Politics under the Spanish Second Republic (Brighton/Portland, 
2000), p. 175.   
11 S. Juliá, La izquierda del PSOE (1935-1936) (Madrid, 1977), p. 1. More recently, see Payne, Collapse, p. 52. 
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radicalisation—including as a shift to left or convergence with the Communist Party—have 
emerged.12    
The concept of radicalisation needs to be rethought and reclaimed for analytical 
purposes, rather than reduced to a descriptive label. As a term, radicalism is frequently taken 
for granted under theorised. It is not uncommon for its etymological origin of proceeding to 
the roots to be cited and also its traditional association with the left.13 Associated with the 
idea of challenge, it often implies going beyond the ‘mainstream’ towards a ‘vision of a better 
world’ and how this is achieved.14 More broadly, to be radical is to challenge. But radicalism 
as Calhoun notes, is not a ‘stable’ ideological position.15 It was not the same to be a ‘radical’ 
in nineteenth-century France demanding an expansion of political space and representation to 
radicalisation as the contemporary concerns around journey by which individuals embrace 
Islamic fundamentalism.16 In this article, radicalisation is a dynamic and reactive process 
often produced by contact and conflict between individuals and groups in which there is a 
shift towards a more militant, confrontational mode and style of politics.17 Radicalism is thus 
contextually rooted; this definition is shaped by the violent, polarising politics of the interwar 
                                                
12 J.M. Macarro Vera, ‘Causas de la radicalización socialista en la II República’, Revista de historia 
contemporánea, 1 (1982), p. 222; S. Souto Kustrín,‘ Taking the Street: Workers’ Youth Organizations and 
Political Conflict in the Spanish Second Republic’, European History Quarterly, Vol. 34 No. 2 (2004), pp. 132, 
134. See also Preston, Coming, p. 2. Recently Aróstegui argued for a more nuanced approach. Aróstegui, Largo, 
pp. 302-3. 
13 E.g. A. Giddens, Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics (Stanford, 1994), p. 1; P. McLaughlin, 
Radicalism: A Philosophical Study (Basingstoke/New York, 2012), p. 17. 
14 I. Kuri-Makdisi, The Eastern Mediterranean and the Making of Global Radicalism, 1860-1914 
(Berkeley/London, 2010), p. 2.  
15 C. Calhoun, The Roots of Radicalism. Tradition, the Public Sphere and Early Nineteenth-Century Social 
Movements (Chicago/London, 2012), p. 6.  
16 Recent studies of ‘radicalisation’ are very much rooted in the context of Western society in the twenty-first 
century in that it denotes Islamicist terrorism, even if the concept is unclear, as noted by M. Sedgwick, ‘The 
Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion’, Terrorism and Political Violence, 22.4 (2010), pp. 479-94 
and P. R. Neumann, ‘The trouble with radicalization’, International Affairs, 89.4 (2013), pp. 873-93. 
17 This relational approach that emphasises dynamism follows a shift in studies of political violence towards 
‘relationalism’. See M. Emirbayer, ‘Manifesto for a Relational Sociology’, American Journal of Sociology,  
Vol. 103 No. 2 (1997), p. 289 and, e.g., E.Y. Alimi, L. Bosi and C. Demetriou, The Dynamics of Radicalization. 
A Relational and Comparative Perspective (New York/Oxford, 2015), though they conceive radicalisation as 
directly tied to violence. Bartlett and Miller, in contrast, define radicalisation as a process by which individuals 
shift from moderate to extreme views, but being radical does not necessarily imply violence. J. Bartlett and C. 
Miller, ‘The Edge of Violence: Towards Telling the Difference Between Violent and Non-Violent 
Radicalization’, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol. 24 No. 1 (2012), pp. 2-3. 
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period. And it is through the historicisation of radicalisation that new light can be shed on 
other historical processes of radicalisation.  
The article begins with an examination of the nature of the communities of the 
Asturian coalfields at the beginning of the Republic and how conflict at local level emerged 
over religion and anticlericalism, sparked by the secularising Republican project. This, along 
with (politicised) concerns over the mining industry, prompted a shift towards a more militant 
attitude amongst workers at local level, to which the socialists—who were the main political 
force in the coalfields and who are the main subject of analysis—responded with an attempt 
to reclaim the label of ‘radical’, though without a change in actual political practice. This 
serves to underline the complexity of the radicalisation process, as argued further in the 
second section, which centres on the socialist mining union (SOMA: Sindicato de Obreros 
Mineros de Asturias), demonstrating that the union stimulated dissent and radicalism through 
its inability to ameliorate the conditions of its members in deteriorating economic 
circumstances. This is far removed from the traditional view of the socialist hierarchy 
radicalising into line with the grassroots. Even so, militant, confrontational attitudes did not 
mean the outright rejection of the Republic, but a more militant interpretation of the regime. 
The reverberations of Nazism’s ascent to power in Germany reached the coalfields, where 
tensions increased in 1933 over the role and meaning of fascism. The third section argues that 
the identified eruption of fascism built on pre-existing divisions and anxieties in the 
coalfields, reshaping community-based struggles. The final section demonstrates that 
community defence was at the centre of protest in the coalfields in 1934 prior to the 
insurrection. The actions of the security forces and the protest at indignity and humiliation 
and in defence of the local community contributed to a radicalising dynamic, with the 
security forces unable to stem protest and mobilisation. Indeed, the spiral of police action—
protest—crackdown only served to increase discontent which rather than centring on labour 
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issues, was directed at the government. Together, these factors provide an interpretation of 
the Asturian insurrection and the process of radicalisation that emphasises the politics and 
lived experience of the working class community.18 This also advances a new approach of 
societal polarisation during the Second Republic, which is central to understanding the 
Spanish Civil War. Spain was far from the only nation-state riven by conflict, fragmentation 
and the challenge of radicalisation, but it would be the first to be subsumed into a civil war.19  
 
I 
The coalfields of central Asturias are one of the heartlands of Spanish industry and have an 
almost mythic status in the history of the Spanish left—not only for the revolutionary 
insurrection, but also the ‘silent’ strikes against the Francoist dictatorship in 1962.20 Asturias 
thus forms part of a wider image of the mine worker as the archetype of the radical working 
class. More recent approaches to mine workers have rightly rejected this essentialised view of 
mine workers, however.21 In terms of Asturias, the powerful image of industrialised valleys 
populated by a left-wing proletariat is not an entirely faithful representation of the coalfields 
as a whole, even if this was the way that the left itself imagined the coalfields. In fact, despite 
                                                
18 I thus share a recent emphasis on the complexity and fluidity of political identities and attitudes towards the 
state in processes of protest and mobilisation. See, e.g., K. McDermott, ‘Popular Resistance in Communist 
Czechoslovakia: The Plzeň Uprising, June 1953’, Contemporary European History, Vol. 19 Iss. 4 (2010), pp. 
287-307. 
19 The context of the 1930s was very different to the break-up of the empires at the end of the First World War 
and the formation of new nation-states.  
20 For analysis of the mythologisation of ‘red Asturias’, see F. Erice, ‘Entre el mito y la memoria histórica: las 
huelgas del 1962 y la tradición épica de la Asturias Roja’, in R. Vega García, coord., Hay una luz en 
Asturias…Las huelgas de 1962 (Gijón, 2012), pp. 413-36.  
21 Deconstruction of the ‘radical miner’ in D. Geary, ‘The Myth of the Radical Miner’, in S. Berger, A. Croll 
and N. LaPorte, eds, Towards a Comparative History of Coalfield Societies (Aldershot, 2005), pp. 43-64. 
Traditionally, the link between mine workers and radicalism was assumed, with scholars attempting to explain 
why miners were militant. The classic foundational text is C. Kerr and A. Siegel, ‘The Interindustry Propensity 
to Strike—An International Comparison’, in A. Kornhauser, R. Kubin and A. Ross, eds, Industrial Conflict 
(New York/Toronto/London, 1954), pp. 189-212. Criticism and alternative theories in G.V. Rimlinger, 
‘International Differences in the Strike Propensity of Coal Miners: Experience in Four Countries’, Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 12 No. 3 (1959), pp. 389-405; M. Bulmer, ‘Sociological Models of the 
Mining Community’, Sociological Review, 23 (1975), pp. 61-92; P. K. Edwards, ‘A critique of the Kerr-Siegel 
Hypothesis of Strikes and the Isolated Mass: A study of the falsification of sociological knowledge’, 
Sociological Review, Vol. 25 Iss. 3 (1977), pp. 551-74.  
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this projection, community-based conflict fuelled the adoption of more radical political 
stances.   
The Asturian coalfields were characterised by a combination of larger urban 
settlements clustered around the deep pits on the valley floors and smaller villages clinging to 
the steep valley sides. Coal mining was the dominant economic activity in the 1930s. In 1934, 
there were 27,596 mine workers in the province—the vast majority of whom worked in the 
central coalfields—divided amongst 900 mines. Women were banned from working inside 
the mines and the number working on the surface in the processing of coal was in decline, 
totalling only 651 women in 1934.22 Coal was not the sole economic activity. The important 
local steel industry was located at the head of the two main valleys in Mieres and La Felguera. 
There were a number of small workshops and other industries in the urban centres, including 
a firebrick factory, in addition to small businesses and services. Subsistence agriculture and 
cattle-rearing was more prominent in the higher reaches of the mountainous interior. As a 
broad characterisation of the socioeconomic situation of the valley, ‘coalfields’ or ‘mining 
valleys’, thus simplifies the variation in local experience. There was no single mining 
experience. The term ‘mine worker’ covered a wide range of roles within the industry while 
the mines varied from deep pits in which hundreds worked to drift mines on the 
mountainsides worked by a handful of men. Yet, this variation did not preclude a strong self-
image of the coalfields as populated by a left-wing proletariat.  
The municipal elections of April 1931 that led to the proclamation of the Second 
Republic were a clear victory for the republican and socialist alliance in the Asturian 
coalfields. The results appeared to cement and confirm the prominence of left-wing culture, 
which had been propagated over the preceding thirty years by trade unions, political parties 
and cultural organisations in the coalfields. This left-wing culture was moulded through a 
                                                
22 Estadística Minera y Metalúrgica de España, 1934, pp. 180, 208-9, 469, 477. 
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dense network of cultural and political centres (ateneos and Casas del Pueblo), associations 
and trade unions.23 With the proclamation of the Republic, the ranks of the two main mining 
unions, the socialist SOMA and anarchist and communist SUM (Sindicato Único de Mineros), 
swelled, reflecting their wider respective national federation (UGT) and confederation (CNT). 
The SUM claimed 9,000 members in June 1931 while SOMA membership almost doubled 
between 1930 and 1932, climbing from 38% of the near 30,000-strong workforce to 69%.24 
However, the SUM split in two over internal tensions in autumn 1931, diminishing the 
union’s influence, with a number of militants moving to the SOMA.25 Trade union and left-
wing cultural institutions—along with bars—were at the heart of social life in the coalfields. 
The overarching left-wing culture based on shared values and expressed through a similar 
range of practices, such as solidarity through raising funds for strikers or collective 
expressions of identity on 1 May parades.26  
Leftist hegemony did not mean that the coalfield communities were politically or 
socially homogenous. While a minority, the political right did exist and religion was a visible 
presence, despite the strong current of anticlericalism in the coalfields—as in the Spanish left 
more widely—and, as elsewhere, this would prove to be a major fault line in the coalfields. 
Catholicism was far from absent. Confessional schools set up by the mining companies 
formed an important part of local education provision in the mining valleys; over 5,000 
children received their education at schools run by religious personnel during the 1932-3 
                                                
23 See A. Mato Díaz, La Atenas del Norte. Ateneos, sociedades culturales y bibliotecas populares en Asturias 
(1876-1937) (Oviedo, 2008) and L. Arias González and M. J. García, Los palacios obreros. Casas del Pueblo 
socialistas en Asturias (1902-1937) (Oviedo, 2010). For Italian ‘houses of the people’, M. Kohn, Radical Space. 
Building the House of the People (Ithaca/London 2003).  
24 A. Barrio Alonso, Anarquismo y anarcosindicalismo en Asturias (1890-1936) (Madrid, 1988), 326; Shubert, 
Revolution, p. 142. The only full length study of the SUM is Ceferino Álvarez, El Sindicato Único de Mineros 
de Asturias (Oviedo, 2004).  
25 Ceferino Álvarez, , ‘El Sindicato Único de Mineros de Asturias (SUM) 1922-1935’, Espacio, Tiempo y 
Forma, Serie V, Historia Contemporánea, 15 (2002), p. 296. 
26 See Uría for discussion of a ‘radical culture’. J. Uría, ‘Asturias 1920-1937, el espacio cultural comunista y la 
cultura de la izquierda: historia de un diálogo entre dos décadas’, in F. Erice, coord., Los comunistas en Asturias 
(1920-1982) (Gijón, 1996), pp. 250-59. The historiography of the performance of collective cultural and 
political identities in the interwar period is extensive. For recent studies of France and Germany, see 
Wardhaugh, Pursuit, and N. Rossol, Performing the Nation in Interwar Germany (Basingstoke, 2010).  
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school year.27 Mining companies had historically played an important role in shaping the 
rhythms of local society. Paternalist policies meant the construction of housing, transport, 
company shops, medical care and even water pumps and barracks for the Civil Guard.28 
These policies were uneven depending on the company and while there was clearly an effort 
to provide a minimum of services in the absence of a strongly articulated modern state, 
housing, education and infrastructure were inadequate for the needs of the local population.  
Secular and anticlerical attitudes were given a powerful boost by the Second Republic, 
which was strongly associated with the promise of social justice, modernisation and reform 
by the crowds who feted it. Religion was identified with the old order—the monarchy and the 
forces of conservatism—and isolated incidents during the celebration of the proclamation of 
the Republic indicated the existence of suspicions that the Church was hostile to the new 
regime even in April 1931.29 The secularising project of the new Republic was enshrined in 
the Constitution passed into law in December 1931. Differences over religion reflected wider 
political differences; indeed, the two were intertwined. Defence of religion proved to be a 
powerful mobilising tool for the right, particularly for Acción Nacional (re-baptised Acción 
Popular [AP] in 1932 and which would form the main basis of CEDA, the party of the 
Catholic right that opposed the Republican constitution).30 The shift towards a more radical, 
confrontational approach by leftists in Asturias in 1932 was due to the twin process of rightist, 
Catholic mobilisation and resistance to the implementation of Republican legislation and 
ideals. Radicalisation was fundamentally a reactive process which was shaped by the 
divisions within the communities themselves, contrasting claims to represent the local 
                                                
27 A. Mato Díaz, La escuela primaria en Asturias. Los procesos de alfabetización y escolarización (Oviedo, 
1992), p. 205.  
28 S. Nevares, El patrono ejemplar. Una obra maestra de Acción Social (Madrid, 1936), p. 29. 
29 See isolated incidents during the celebration of the proclamation of the Republic that indicate the existence of 
suspicions that the Church was hostile to the new regime even in April 1931 in El Noroeste, 16 Apr. 1931 and 
Región, 19 Apr. 1931. 
30 Preston, Coming, p. 35; M. Vincent, Catholicism in the Second Spanish Republic. Religion and Politics in 
Salamanca, 1930-1936 (Oxford, 1996), pp. 180-83; W.J. Callahan, The Catholic Church in Spain, 1875-1998 
(Washington, 2000), p. 310. For Asturias, Región, 8, 16, 17, 21 Oct. 1931.  
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community and frustrations at unfulfilled delivery of hopes and expectations associated with 
the Republican project.  
Tensions and conflicts emerged all over Spain over religion, whether Catholics 
rallying in defence of the crucifix in school classrooms or their opponents pressuring to 
introduce secularising measures, such as removing walls separating Catholic and civil 
cemeteries.31 In Asturias, attention began to turn to parish priests in the towns and villages in 
autumn 1931 and accelerated towards the end of the year. Priests were criticised by reports in 
the socialist provincial press for attacking the draft Constitution from the pulpit.32 Tensions in 
the pueblos increased in 1932 in response to rightist mobilisation—the AP went on a 
‘massive recruitment drive’—combined with pressures from the left to implement secular 
legislation, which connected with pre-existing anticlerical currents within the left.33 There 
was a profound grassroots desire to collaborate in the construction of the Republic and 
collective mobilisation was utilised to push for the implementation of Republican ideals. In 
April 1932, miners went on strike to demand the removal of Dominicans who staffed a school 
run by the coal and steel company, Duro-Felguera. The company had closed the school the 
previous September as the Dominicans were no longer allowed to teach as they lacked 
qualifications, while the municipal authorities had fruitlessly tried to convince the company 
to hand over the classrooms. When the company reopened the school with religious staff, 
2,000 mine workers went on strike.34 The strike resulted in a victory for the workforce, 
though it was the only occasion that the workforce prevailed.  
                                                
31 For a synthesis of regional studies detailing these conflicts, see A.L. López Villaverde, El gorro frigio y la 
mitra frente a frente. Construcción y diversidad territorial del conflicto político-religioso en la España 
republicana (n.p., 2008) pp. 190-245.  
32 Avance, 15 Dec. 1931; El Noroeste, 13 Jan. 1932. Avance even dedicated its Actualidad regional column to 
the criticisms made by priests. Avance, 17, 19 Dec. 1931.  
33 Preston, Coming, pp. 36-7.  
34 The request turned out to be a fabrication. M.V. Álvarez Fernández, La escuela del paternalismo asturiano 
(1880-1937) (Gijón, 2006), pp. 281-3; El Noroeste, 24, 26 Apr. 1932. 
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Much more common than industrial disputes was the pattern of small scale conflicts 
which formed part of the texture and pattern of everyday experience in the pueblos in 1932 
and contributed to an escalating dynamic of resistance and reaction. The provincial socialist 
press published the sentiments of frustration from leftists in the coalfields, who criticised the 
efforts by priests and the religiously-minded to convince individuals to observe a religious 
marriage in the context of the Republican government’s move to make civil marriages the 
sole legally recognised form. Religion was a private matter; such individuals should not be 
interfering in matters through taking Catholicism to the doorsteps of the local population.35  
Even as crucifixes were removed from classrooms in line with government guidelines, they 
began to proliferate around the necks of Catholics in early 1932. This led to a reaction from 
‘youths’ in Mieres and Sama, who sounded cowbells as women wearing crucifixes walked 
past on their evening stroll.36 This adapted the traditional practice of the cencerrada, whereby 
individuals, often remarrying widows or widowers, were taunted by members of the local 
community on their wedding night.37 In this case, the bells called attention to and ridiculed 
local Catholics, who were perceived as an affront to anticlerical culture. Frustrations grew 
towards the summer at the growing gap between what the Republic was understood to signify 
and the realities in the pueblos as Catholics mobilised in defence of their beliefs. There was a 
wave of iconoclasm directed at local churches and shrines in the summer of 1932, in marked 
contrast to the relative peace of 1931.38 Such violence was often used just before the local 
feast day in an attempt to disrupt the patterns of Catholic religious observation, express 
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dissent, and assert that religious practices did not represent the local community. Leftist, 
secular hegemony was affirmed.  
Tensions did not emerge solely over religion. The wider economic context of the early 
1930s was hardly an auspicious moment in which to construct a democracy designed to 
implement social justice for the workers and agricultural labourers. Unemployment rose. In 
Asturias, the economic problems facing the mining industry in 1932 were refracted through 
the political context of the Republic. Workers in Turón and Figaredo attributed company 
slow-downs to anti-Republican company attitudes.39 This political reading of economic 
problems compounded pre-existing class-based criticism of the companies. The reaction to 
this perceived resistance to the Republic—and companies were certainly critical of the 
government’s actions despite the lack of an overall governmental economic policy—helped 
fuel growing discontent and more confrontational and radical stances and a more militant 
defence of the regime. In 1931 the socialists had been careful to highlight that the Republic 
was a bourgeois political system and not their regime, even as they participated in its 
institutions and proudly claimed to be contributing to it as a political project.40 But criticism 
of the Republic made it difficult to maintain this fine line and, at local level at least, socialists 
became more militant in their defence of the regime, in whose project they were affectively 
invested. This was particularly evident in the response to the failed coup led by general 
Sanjurjo in August 1932 which was met in Asturias by a call for more Republic. Avance’s 
editorial demanded the Republic make ‘a sharp turn to the left’ while in Sama, workers were 
prepared to ‘take to the streets’ in defence of the Republic, empowered by the Republican 
project.41 In Langreo, in response to a motion tabled by communist councillors, a local 
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leading socialist councillor declared that the socialists were ‘radical’, but were also in 
government and that accordingly they would follow the government line.42 
The comments by the socialist councillor were representative of a wider desire on the 
part of socialists to wrestle back the term ‘radical’ in 1932 from the anarchists and 
communists. This was a marked shift from their self-proclaimed moderation in 1931, even if 
a self-proclaimed radical stance did not mean a move away from the Republic itself. Indeed, 
socialists demonstrated a sharper desire to defend the Republic. This shift was partly in 
response to the left-right struggles, but also due to tussles within the left itself. It also 
indicates a change in the political balance amongst the grassroots in the coalfields between 
1931 and 1932. Put crudely, to be radical was fashionable and desirable. Several mine 
workers from La Cobertoria mine criticised the fact that in assemblies ‘he who says the most 
outrageous comments [barbaridades] is the one who comes out best’.43 Sensitive to this shift, 
the socialists adopted a more assertive attitude. Socialists in Olloniego proclaimed themselves 
to be the ‘true revolutionaries’.44 This shift in the political balance was partly a response to a 
growth in union membership: newcomers tried to appear the most radical in order to prove 
their political mettle. According to reports, workers who had never belonged to unions had 
become ‘the most revolutionary’ in Turón while in Bazuelo (Mieres) the most revolutionary 
elements were those who had previously belonged to the party of the Primo de Rivera 
dictatorship (1923-30), Unión Patriótica.45 Anticlericalism became an important measure of 
radicalism: individuals competed to present themselves as more radical by slurring purported 
religious observance by others. The expulsion of an individual from the communist party was 
declared with pride in the provincial press—‘That is how we communists react to those who 
humiliate themselves before the Church’—while elsewhere a socialist was under such 
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pressure that he took to the provincial press to refute rumours that he had smuggled his 
daughter to a different pueblo in order to baptise her.46 This internal competitiveness within 
the left to present oneself as more radical fuelled pressures within the local community, 
where conflicts between different groups and rumours formed an important part of day-to-day 
life.  
 However, even as socialists staked a claim to radicalism, there was no shift in strategy 
away from moderation. Strike action and violence were to be avoided—they were hallmarks 
of extremism, associated with communists and anarchists, with their immature and unrealistic 
demands. SOMA leader Graciano Antuña criticised an anarchist-led strike: ‘One is not more 
radical or more revolutionary for being an early-riser and declaring strikes for trifling reasons. 
It is necessary to choose the right moment for the fight against capital’. 47  Socialist 
contestation of the concept ‘radical’ by leaders was rhetorical; indeed, the fact that the term 
was often accompanied by its definition indicates a desire to reinterpret radicalism within the 
Republic itself. Nevertheless, the attempt to appropriate the term was symptomatic of a 
socialist desire to counter a perceived shift in the political atmosphere at grassroots. This shift 
was towards greater radicalism emerging out of conflicts over religion and secularism and 
also internal competition within the left.  
 
II 
The wider economic situation continued to deteriorate and the slowdown in the Asturian 
mining industry, which had historically struggled to compete with British coal, became 
increasingly marked between 1932 and 1933. Mines closed, short-time working was 
introduced and there were delays in the payment of wages. The SOMA was reluctant to call a 
general strike, eventually doing so in the autumn of 1932, which would be followed by two 
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more over the following months. The second strike was called in February 1933 after the 
SOMA balloted its members, who voted overwhelmingly in favour of strike action, though 
even as the strike began the SOMA continued to emphasise its limited demands and support 
for the republican-socialist government.48 However, the solution negotiated by the SOMA to 
the second strike only succeeded in alienating grassroots mine workers. Rather than 
unemployment causing radicalism through stimulating a leftist shift by the SOMA, it was the 
SOMA’s inability to solve the problems faced by its members and to provide hope for a 
better future, compounded by the alienation of those who lost their jobs that contributed to 
the adoption of radical positions. Meanwhile, the communists and anarchists struggled to 
dictate the rhythm of industrial action at local level. In November 1932, the communists were 
drawn into the general strike called by the SOMA, attempted to prolong it, but ultimately 
failed to win much support.49 
 The solution found to the February 1933 strike was a reduction in the workforce by 
10%—approximately 3,000—through an early retirement and subsidy scheme, and a cap on 
production.50 The mine workers voted overwhelmingly in favour of this solution, though it 
soon became clear, however, that their expectations would not be matched by what happened 
in practice. There were too few volunteers for retirement and the subsidy scheme, which is 
perhaps understandable, given that the pensions and subsidies on offer were only a fraction of 
the daily wage. Wildcat strikes emerged as miners protested at layoffs: they had not expected 
the measures to affect them personally.51 Companies targeted cheaper younger workers and 
there were reports of increasing dissent in the coalfields. Observers reported that a 
‘revolutionary wave’ was being born in the mines and groups of younger mine workers 
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muttered darkly together, their desperation manifest in a desire for violence and revolution.52 
Resentment was growing at how the union had ostracised younger mine workers, which 
manifested itself in a desire for greater militancy.  
Far from leading radicalism or following its members, the SOMA was actually 
alienating its members. This is not to say that organisations are inherently antiethetical to 
radicalism in this understanding of the concept. Trade unions and associations can play an 
important role in fomenting and providing the structures to encourage radical positions, in 
addition to adopting a confrontational, militant mode of political action themselves. This was 
the case with the Socialist Youth, as it was with youth engagement in politics in Europe more 
widely. The ranks of political formations on the far right and left were often with students 
and youths.53 Nevertheless, in Asturias, the SOMA continued in its moderation and caution 
well into 1934. 
The SOMA was also ineffective in addressing the problems faced by the industry and 
a third general mining strike in the autumn actually only extended the agreement from the 
previous strike. This led to further dissent and militancy. The fact that thousands downed 
tools demonstrated SOMA’s capacity to organise strike action, but were not necessarily 
expressions of support for the union. The union was merely capable of unleashing and 
organising collective action, rather than controlling and directing it. Mine workers organised 
and collaborated via assemblies at local level and the pressure that they exercised at this level 
appeared more effective than the union structures. Non-payment of wages led to wildcat 
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strikes in Mieres, to the frustration of the SOMA, which opposed such action, but grassroots 
pressure was nevertheless successful: Fábrica de Mieres quickly paid the owed wages.54 
Even with dissent, growing radicalism did not mean an outright rejection of the 
Republic by socialists at the grassroots. The more confrontational, hardened attitude entailed 
a demand for a more militant Republic, which was an extension of the feeling expressed in 
defence of the regime in 1932, but with a still harder edge. This demand for militancy 
coincided with the radicalisation of Largo Caballero’s rhetoric in the summer of 1933. An 
Avance editorial declared, ‘[a]ll that of “Republic for all” is for all those who want a Republic, 
but there are people who do not want it, as occurs with every new regime. Well, these people 
should not be taken into count . . . The Republic has to be introduced against them’.55 With 
the collapse of the republican-socialist governmental coalition, elections were convened. The 
provincial socialist newspaper declared on the eve of the elections: ‘IF THEY SPEAK TO 
YOU OF REPUBLIC FOR ALL, REPLY (sic): Republic for me, because I work. Not for 
everyone. Not the capitalist who lives at my expense . . . I want my Republic, the Social 
Republic’.56 This aggressive assertion of a particular vision of the Republic was a means of 
distancing the socialists from their electoral rivals, but the effect was to reject the present and 
project an alternative future. This was the recovery of the future, of a more radical vision. 
This new Republican future was more strongly defined: it would be a ‘social Republic’, itself 
more radical and militant in its implementation and defence of working-class interests, as 
understood by leftists. 
 
III 
There is little doubt that fascism formed part of the ‘frame’ for the revolutionary insurrection 
through contributing to the political atmosphere. Although there were very few fascists in 
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Spain in 1933—and still fewer in the Asturian coalfields—trying to locate actual fascists fails 
to engage with the role that fascism—or the idea of fascism—played in Asturias 1933-4.57 As 
a term, fascism injected a sense of fear and threat—not least because of the wider 
international context—while mapping onto and transforming pre-existing community 
divisions. Understanding fascism as a frame needs to be taken further; it provided a way of 
imagining both the enemy and a dystopian future. The fascist enemy was perceived as an 
internal and external threat, shaped by experiences within the communities and by national 
politics. This fuelled a sense of anxiety. Gender and politics were intertwined; the right-wing 
threat was frequently feminised and understood as an opposite to masculine, proletarian 
identities. Over the course of 1933 and 1934 fascism became part of the language of the 
coalfields, as is seen in its increased use in the provincial socialist press. Fascism was 
understood to have appeared in the province for the first time in March 1933 with reports of 
the plastering of fascist posters in Oviedo but while communists organised a few antifascist 
rallies, it was only towards the summer that fascism was taken seriously.58  
 As a term, fascism was flexible and there was a lack of clarity as to what fascism 
actually meant or what the position of Spanish political formations was. Gil Robles, leader of 
CEDA, visited Nazi Germany in 1933 and an ambiguous attitude towards fascism. He was 
impressed by the spectacle but critical of the Nazi position towards the Church. El Debate, 
the CEDA mouthpiece, admired Dollfuss, though for the left Dollfuss’ Catholic 
authoritarianism was difficult to distinguish from fascism—or the road to fascism—in 1934.59 
Indeed, the relationship of fascism to Catholicism was particularly vexing. Spain’s fascist 
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party the Falange was closely linked to other rightist political forces and the Church: in 
Asturias the ‘most active elements’ of the Falangist student union came from Catholic Action, 
there were forms for joining Falange at the offices of CEDA-supporting Región, Canon 
Manuel Gutiérrez was at the heart of the local party and in Moreda the small Catholic miners’ 
union would become a Falangist centre.60 The left swung between associating fascism with 
religion, which was convenient for identifying ideological opponents, and attempting to 
separate the two. The UGT newspaper declared that Spanish ‘indigenous fascism’ would be 
‘monarchist-clerical-capitalist’. 61  In August 1933, the provincial socialist daily Avance 
claimed Catholicism and fascism went hand-in-hand, only to declare both that fascism, ‘a 
reactionary movement’, should not be confused with ‘clericalism’, yet predicted that Spanish 
fascism would be based on Catholicism less than three weeks later.62 The situation was far 
from clear in the provincial socialist press whether in the articles sent in from the pueblos or 
in editorials themselves. Fascism was used flexibly, as an epithet that nevertheless denoted 
vehement opposition to leftist political projects.  
Meanwhile, wider socialist discourse began to describe Catholicism and fascism as 
‘the two sides of the same coin’, which developed from the projection of the Church as 
enemy of the socialists.63 Interpretations of fascism were thus entangled with pre-existing 
anticlerical suspicions and mapped onto pre-existing divisions in the coalfields. The very 
nature of fascism—that it was a surreptitious and creeping threat—heightened fears and 
connected discursively with the frequent (and traditional) accusation of ‘Jesuitical’ tactics. 
Fascist propaganda in La Felguera had been slipped into a magazine at a cultural centre.64 
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This hidden nature was an indicator of the lack of “real” fascists in the coalfields, yet the 
even if fascism was not overt or publicly recognisable the alertness of the local left meant that 
fascism was perceived. The very fact that it was undetected served to heighten sense of the 
threat rather than reduce it.  
As the elections of November 1933 neared, fascism had become an important part of 
the political language of the left, though it would only be in the aftermath that community-
based anxieties would be heightened. In truth, leftists were relatively dismissive of rightist 
mobilisation in the coalfields ahead of the elections: rightists were presented as a negligible 
and female presence not representative of the local communities, in contrast to the male, 
leftist proletarians. The gap between such projections of the local community and the actual 
results fuelled a reactive, radical backlash and anxiety amongst the local left; the local 
community did not match expectations. In Santullano (Mieres) rightist campaigning was 
attributed to ‘four women’ and two teachers, with the use of ‘four’ likely a linguistic trope to 
indicate scarcity than an accurate number.65 This reinforced the claim that these individuals 
were not representative of the local community. Indeed, rightist campaigners were frequently 
projected as either a minority or from outside the pueblo; ‘beatas’, a term used for 
religiously-minded older women, arrived in the village of Sinariegos (Aller) directed by 
‘friars and priests’ to criticise socialists. 66  Such comments belittling rightist female 
mobilisation, which was an important feature of the electoral campaign, were underscored by 
an undercurrent of misogynism and pride in masculine work-based (and youthful) identities 
on the left.67 Thus, despite anxieties around fascism, the right was still portrayed as a 
negligible presence.   
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The elections of 1933 were a defeat for the republicans and socialists, whose split and 
mutual animosity was fatal in an electoral system which favoured coalitions and collaboration. 
In Asturias, a broad rightist alliance candidacy won a clear victory, though the socialists 
gained most votes in the coalfields.68 The outcome, though, reflected the national picture 
where the Catholic CEDA returned the highest number of deputies, but without a 
parliamentary majority. It fell to the Radical Party, a historic republican party but which had 
split from the republican-socialist coalition in 1931 and become increasingly conservative, to 
form governments with the support of CEDA, whose attitude to the Republic was ambivalent 
at best. These would re-channel the Republic through slowing or reversing the reforming 
measures of the first biennium.69 There was a distinct shift in the orientation of the Republic, 
even if there was not wholesale derogation of legislation from the first biennium.  
Even if the socialists had demonstrated that they were the predominant force in the 
coalfields, the number of votes polled by the right indicated that far more than “four beatas” 
had voted for them. The election results rocked understandings of the local community. The 
right was more representative of the local community than had previously been supposed, 
which led to head-scratching and consternation amongst the local left. Calculations in Trubia 
could not account for it and blamed workers who were ‘traitors’ and women, both the 
‘beatería’ and the daughters of workers. In Murias (Aller) rightist votes were also attributed 
to the influence of women (‘you do not get fed if you do not go to mass’), a cooperative run 
by the small Catholic miners’ union and ‘disorganised and disoriented’ workers.70 There is 
evidence that shaking perceptions about the local community led to an increased social 
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pressure within the confines of towns and village. The widow of a notable socialist in 
Laviana published an article in Avance that as a socialist woman she felt isolated and 
embattled, writing that ‘[i]n Laviana, like everywhere else, it seems that being a socialist is a 
crime’ while proudly declaring that ‘I state [hago constar] that I am a socialist revolutionary 
and I am not ashamed of it’.71 In her public declaration, she made a radical restatement of her 
ideas and identity, sparked by a feeling of being under attack.  
The elections and change of government had important effects. Now the fascist threat 
had to be present in the coalfields: the ascendance and victory of the right meant that this was 
inevitable. ‘Fascists’ were reported to be ‘emerging’ in pueblos around Asturias, including in 
Turón.72 An article from Tuilla (Langreo) tried to convince local inhabitants that fascists did 
exist locally as ‘this pueblo cannot be an exception’ claiming that previous enemies had 
adapted to the ‘political circumstances’ and become fascists, ‘taking up positions cautiously 
and astutely, taking advantage of our excessive confidence and good faith’. Fascism needed 
to exist because historically there were rightists in Tuilla. The article was a call to 
mobilisation; action was needed.73 Yet, even as fascism was said to exist and would exist, 
fascism as incarnated by the Falange was not present within the mining valleys. Indeed, in 
early 1934, the Falange was still without a centre in Asturias and struggled to mobilise 
support, as in the rest of Spain.74  
In addition to the urgent need to identify local fascists, the change of government had 
an important effect in shifting how the threat to the left was perceived.  Crucially, the success 
of the CEDA meant that the national government was now understood as a (possible) 
harbinger of fascism. The introduction of measures that marked a distinct change from the 
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principles of the Republic—as defined in the first biennium—and a more aggressive 
approach to policing and strike action were a betrayal and attack on the working class. This 
combined with the international context, particularly the events in February 1934 in Austria, 
only served to heighten fears around the role of the government and the possibility of the 
gradual implantation of fascism from above. In Oviedo in February, an Asturian socialist 
leader declared that Spain had to choose between two ‘roads’: ‘Germany and Italy, or 
Russia’.75 Anxieties and fears around fascism served to energise political action and reduce 
the options available to the left. Revolution was the only alternative.  
The Workers’ Alliance (Alianza Obrera) looms large in histories of October 1934 as 
the materialisation of trade union—and therefore of working class—unity. The first Alianza 
Obrera per se on a national level promoted by the dissident communists of the BOC (Bloque 
Obrero y Campesino: Workers’ and Peasants’ Bloc) in Barcelona in March 1933, and 
broadened to include the Catalan socialists in December.76 But even as the socialist line 
modified to be publicly in favour of alliances, initiatives were subject to the strategic 
considerations of the socialist movement under Largo Caballero; alliances were to be 
encouraged where the socialist movement was weak compared to the anarchists.77  
 Focusing on the structure of the Alliance or on the concept as deriving from Maurín, 
the BOC leader, serves to overlook other—earlier—mechanisms of worker unity. In Asturias, 
grassroots unity had actually emerged from the beginning of 1933, but the SOMA, in line 
with the national leadership, was not keen and a local socialist was expelled from the union.78 
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This did not stop grassroots frustrations channelling to unity initiatives at local level, such as 
through joint strike committees. By early 1934, the provincial socialist newspaper was 
inundated with consultative letters and articles from socialists eager for leftist unity. The 
newspaper stalled, declaring rather weakly:  
The united front (sic) of the workers is to be found in such clear terms that it can 
already be considered to be a reality. Given that it has taken shape in a general way, 
which was what was hoped for, and is effective now that it is so, it need not emerge, 
therefore, from any private or local initiatives.79 
 
 Amador Fernández, a SOMA leader, was critical of grassroots initiatives, writing that 
‘[r]ecently we have seen spectacles that leave a lot to be desired’, in line with the position of 
the socialist national leadership.80 In this reading, the Asturian Alliance, initially proposed by 
the anarchists, was actually a agreement between socialist and anarchist hierarchies signed 
behind closed doors in a wider context in which collaboration at local level was routine.  
 The signing of the Alliance did mark something of a turning a point. It was an 
opportunity for renewed vitriolic mutual mud-slinging by socialists and communists, which 
served to sharpen differences between the two movements, even if there was still some 
grassroots co-operation, albeit fragile. The Alliance thus served to mobilise and heighten 
socialist pride and self-esteem, rather than as an actual vehicle for militancy in spring-
summer 1934, as the socialists actually tried to isolate the Alliance from labour struggles.81  
Indeed, the life of the Alliance in towns and villages is unclear. There were a few rallies in 
spring-summer 1934, while a later anarchist account has little to say about the life of the 
Alliance, though collaboration between unions in strike action continued at local level.82 The 
                                                
79 Avance, 7 Jan. 1934. 
80 Avance, 7 Jan. 1934. Largo Caballero’s similar position in Aróstegui, Largo Caballero, p. 354. 
81 Ruiz, Insurrección, p. 92.  
82 Avance, 3, 5, 6, 17 May 1934; ‘Informe del Comité Regional de Asturias de la CNT elevado al Pleno 
Regional de sindicatos sobre los acontecimientos de octubre de 1934 y otro informe de la Comisión de la 
Alianza Obrera Regional Revolucionaria remitido al Comité citado’, Centro Documental de la Memoria 
Histórica, PS-Gijón, Series J, Box 12, Document 3.  
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Alliance had important effects for forging a sense of solidarity, even if the Alliance itself was 
not part of everyday experience. The idea of the Alliance and union structures would be 
vehicles for mobilisation and organisation during the revolutionary insurrection.  
 
IV 
Critical to mobilisation and the eruption of protest—and ultimately the force behind the 
insurrection—was a desire to defend the local community, local authority and dignity, and a 
sense of what the Republic should be in the face of (perceived) aggression from the state 
security forces. There were intense waves of tension and conflict in March-April and 
September. The key to these episodes was not economic issues; even if strikes were one of 
the principal methods of protest, the most intense mobilisation came in response to the 
actions of the security forces.83 Protest was political in the sense that it was about power 
dynamics, contesting the role and actions of the state security forces. But it was also about the 
defence of a certain understanding of the local community and fuelled by a clear sense of 
humiliation and disempowerment. Consequently, the actions of the security forces were 
experienced as the confirmation of the distance and incompatibility of the central government 
with the left and local government in the coalfields. Importantly, however, the actions of the 
security forces, far from reducing protest, actually only succeeded in provoking further 
protest, which was due to the cohesion of leftist organisations and, above all, of leftist 
identities linked to claims to represent the local community. This fusion of community and 
the left was a powerful foundation for confrontation and is testament to the emotional 
underpinning of political mobilisation at local level.  
The change in the political context was experienced at local level with a more 
aggressive policing style. Searches began in mid-February 1934 with workers frisked on the 
                                                
83 Scholars have mentioned the ‘political’ nature of strikes in the coalfields in 1934, but this needs to be taken 
further and redefined. See, for example, Shubert, Revolution, p. 152; Bizcarrondo, Historia, pp. 103-8. 
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way to work. The situation in the coalfields was tense, as demonstrated by an incident in 
Laviana. Two individuals were arrested for carrying knives. They were released after a 
protest demonstration brought hundreds to the gates of the prison and the security forces 
withdrew. When a local socialist councillor was arrested and accused of leading the protest, 
mine workers called a strike.84 The situation had escalated quickly and indicated both the 
tensions and the level of cohesion at local level as protestors expressed their alternate concept 
of justice based on the idea of the self-policing pueblo, traditionally prevalent in a country 
which had historically struggled to articulate a modern nation-state. The local community 
would resolve its own problems and police its own interests, according to community-based 
notions of justice.  
In March and April searches increased and the situation deteriorated, serving to erode 
the (already problematic) relationship between the left and the security forces. A new 
Minister of the Interior was appointed, Salazar Alonso, who had a ‘Manichean view of 
politics’.85 Salazar introduced the state of alarm in the whole of Spain in response to strikes in 
Madrid and a more aggressive policing policy.86 Such tactics were framed by the local press 
in political and class terms: Avance highlighted that it was the left that was targeted; state 
actions were understood as criminalising the working class and framed as such by the 
provincial socialist newspaper, which protested vehemently at the security forces. 87 
Meanwhile, the municipal authorities voiced their own criticism of the new government’s 
policies. Even if there was not wholesale derogation of the legislation of the previous 
biennium, certain measures indicated a distinct shift in the Republic. Some state funding was 
reintroduced for the Church, the death penalty was reinstated and those imprisoned for the 
1932 coup were freed. Suspicions increased and the distance between the government and 
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municipal authorities widened, with the latter telegraphing their protest to the government in 
what they perceived to be a defence of the ‘spirit of April 1931’ and the interests of the local 
community.88 Leftist local authorities were thus willing to challenge the national government 
and assume a proactive role in protecting the interests and desires of the Republic’s 
supporters. While protestors were defending local communities, union centres and even 
homes, as well as the spirit of the Republic, the provincial authorities saw protest as a 
question of public order. The civil governor refused to back down, declaring that searches 
would continue and he ‘was sure that this excitation would not have any consequences’.89 
And the tension escalated into April. 
The problem lay in the very nature of the actions of the state security forces, which 
were experienced as humiliating and a violation of space. On 27 March, miners’ food baskets 
and homes were searched in Laviana, and mine workers left work early in protest.90 Women 
were arrested in Langreo for protesting at the search of their homes and councillors 
complained at the damage to furniture and locks broken by the security forces: ‘What is most 
disgraceful is that those who are the target of body and house searches are those people and 
social and political organisations who worked the hardest and sacrificed the most in the 
service of the Republic’.91 What compounded the humiliation was the use of Republican 
institutions against its supporters. Protest was stimulated by a powerful sense of dignity and 
humiliation, which fomented a sense of alienation and incompatibility with the national 
government. This was seized upon by Avance, which continued to attack the government. 
Over the following months it was repeatedly targeted with fines, banned 94 times over 186 
                                                
88 Archivo de Langreo, Actas del ayuntamiento de Langreo: 07-10-1933 al 16-06-1934, ff. 141-2. See similar 
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89 Avance, 28 Mar. 1934.  
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days and its editor arrested.92 Its radical rhetoric, such as describing how workers in Sama felt 
they were in a ‘full state of war’ on being searched on their way out of work, led to a firm 
response from the authorities which only served to legitimise its stance in the eyes of the 
Asturian left, who rallied around the newspaper.93  
Anger was channelled into strikes—the prime method of collective action in the 
coalfields—which spread quickly, indicating the strong articulation of solidarity and the 
tensions in the coalfields. Fifteen hundred mine workers at the Mariana mine in Mieres went 
on strike in protest at arrests (which included that of local communist leaders); this spread to 
other industries and the municipalities of Aller and Lena the following day, with the number 
of strikers increasing tenfold. As the situation started to move out of control an appeal was 
made for calm and in Mieres the three trade unions called for a return to work. 94 
Fundamentally, strikes were organised in response to arrests and the actions of the security 
forces. The security forces and their strategies, far from reducing protest, only succeeded in 
accelerating opposition.  
 The escalation coincided with Holy Week. As in 1932, churches, which were a visible 
and readily available target, were attacked in frustration and protest. Such attacks can also be 
understood as an attempt to reassert a particular image of a left-wing anticlerical political 
culture that was projected onto the local community. Attacks on church buildings attempted 
to disrupt ceremonies and continued, over the following weeks, during fiestas. Iconoclastic 
violence formed part of the culture of confrontation at local level and the pattern of protest. 
When individuals were arrested and accused of the violence, strikes erupted. Avance printed 
accusations that the iconoclasm was a conspiracy by the right; while this was implausible it 
fitted the narrative of a government that was targeting the left, not least when several of those 
                                                
92 Shubert, Revolution, p. 151.  
93 Avance, 27 Mar. 1934. 
94 Avance, 3, 4, 5 Apr. 1934. 
30 
 
 
 
arrested were prominent local leftists, who were unlikely to have been involved in the 
violence.95  
 The growing crystallisation of the gulf between the local left and the state was also 
evident in two further developments. Firstly, in accordance with the socialist plans for a 
revolutionary movement, guns were being smuggled out of the arms factory in Oviedo from 
late 1933 and hidden in the coalfields. Despite the range of operations, few weapons fell into 
the hands of the police, testament to the socialist movement’s organisational capabilities. 
Such operations must have had an important effect amongst the activists involved, tying them 
together in clandestine networks that attempted to keep ahead of the security forces.96 The 
conspiracy thus widened and cemented the sense of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Similarly, a crackdown 
on the use of political uniforms in the summer was interpreted by the red-shirted Socialist 
Youth as an attempt to stifle their activism and fuelled opposition. In response, they paraded 
outside the prison where the editor of Avance was being held.97 Government measures were 
met with a radical, confrontational response channelled by the socialist youth organisation. 
In September the tension increased. A female demonstration was broken up in Sama 
by the security forces with gunshots and several bystanders were injured. The newspaper 
report in the socialist press is revealing of the sentiment of alienation and disempowerment. It 
was no longer a question of distance between the government and the coalfields, but of a 
‘foreign’ power that had invaded the coalfields. Local communities were disempowered and 
alienated: ‘It seems as though we are in the middle of a war. In reality it is an invasion. In 
reality it is the army of a power foreign to the pueblo which is corralling, flogging and 
shooting at it’.98 The mayor requested that the security forces were not present for the 
funeral—the left would keep order. The fact that it managed to do so only served to underline 
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that the security forces were the problem. There was a general strike in the coalfields, jointly 
organised by socialists, anarchists and communists. Demonstrative of the tension was the 
appeal made by the strike committee for people to leave Sama.99 The coexistence of the 
security forces and the working class left was impossible. Meanwhile, Avance continued to 
fan the revolutionary flames, emphasising darkly that Spain was occupied by an army and 
warning that armies were the causes of wars.100 
 
V 
Without arms or the CEDA’s entry into government, the insurrection would not have 
occurred. Spanish leftists were well aware of the rise of fascism and the authoritarian right in 
Europe, and were particularly shaken by the failed uprising by Austrian socialists in February 
1934. But the force of the Asturian insurrection cannot be solely explained by socialist 
conspiring, the appointment of CEDA ministers or by references to the wider context. 
National and international developments are insufficient explanations in themselves. The 
increasing confrontation and radicalisation of the Asturian coalfields is key to understanding 
the revolutionary insurrection that exploded with such force in October 1934. These conflicts 
and radicalism were rooted very much in the industrial communities of the coalfields, but 
shaped by the wider Spanish and European context.  
The socialist shift from participating in government to planning a revolution is 
generally conceptualised as ‘radicalisation’, and historians have long it seen as pivotal. 
Standard interpretations focus on national-level events and the role of Largo Caballero, who 
it is argued, led the planning of the revolutionary movement with the backing of his (often 
young) supporters, the Caballeristas. To see radicalisation as a straightforward one-
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directional process, a shift to the left, and even a ‘pro-Bolshevik attitude’ is insufficient.101 
That the communist movement was weak was no incentive for the socialists to move to the 
left and understanding radicalism as convergence with communism is reductive and 
inadequate for understanding the processes at work during the Second Republic. A similar 
reductive focus on the responsibility of the socialists can be observed in analysis of why the 
Asturian insurrection occurred.102 Indeed, Shubert highlighted in the 1980s that the two 
explanations of the insurrection—socialist responsibility versus a process of working-class 
radicalisation—are far from mutually exclusive.103 
This article has shown that the way that radicalisation is understood and characterised 
needs to be reformulated. The foregrounding of economic factors and labour politics neglects 
the way in which the struggles in (and over) the Republic were played out at community level. 
Rather, the dynamics of protest and radical politics need to be understood in the context of 
political struggles in and over the communities of the coalfields.104 The coalfields were far 
from monolithic communities. Attention needs to be paid to divisions within them, as they 
contributed to the dynamic process of radicalisation. Thus, while the left—in its different 
facets—was hegemonic, it did not monopolise culture and politics. The conflict over religion 
was crucial in the context of the secularising Republican project and leftist anticlericalism. It 
is foregrounding the community as a subject to be constructed and mobilised, as opposed to 
community as locus or predetermined, that allows for a richer understanding of militancy and 
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mentalities during the Republic.105 In Asturias, only through an appreciation of the struggles 
over religion, rivalry within the left, anxieties over the emergence of ‘fascism’, and the 
actions of the state security forces can both the process of radicalisation and the force of the 
revolutionary insurrection be understood. 
Radicalisation is crucial to understanding the Second Republic, but it needs to be 
rethought and reclaimed for analytical purposes, rather than existing purely as a descriptive 
label. Through a focus on political practice and lived experience, this article shows radicalism 
to be a particular mode and style of politics, which is necessarily confrontational and militant, 
whether physically, rhetorically or even ideationally. While community divisions helped to 
drive (reactively) the radicalisation of the left, but this did not mean a rejection of Republican 
democracy. Rather, the Republic was reinterpreted in a more radical, combative manner. This 
underlines the need to take a more nuanced approach to the study of the meaning of the 
Republic and democracy in 1930s’ Spain. In this process, emotions were a significant factor 
in the escalation of protest. Collective fears, anxieties and feelings of humiliation are crucial 
to understanding the increasingly bitter and confrontational political climate in the coalfields; 
it was the understanding of state actions as unjust that stimulated the cycle of protest and 
repression in spring 1934.106 Without understanding community-based protest and the role of 
emotions within it, it is impossible to understand the process of radicalisation. Analysing 
radicalism in this way provides a new framework for understanding the revolutionary 
insurrection of 1934, the nature of the Second Republic, the polarisation of Spanish society, 
the Spanish Civil War and interwar Europe.  
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